Feeling Good–Doing Good: A Conceptual Analysis of the Mood at Work–Organizational Spontaneity Relationship

Jennifer M. George
Department of Management, College of Business Administration, and Graduate School of Business, Texas A&M University

Arthur P. Brief
Freeman School of Business and Department of Psychology
Tulane University

Five forms of organizational spontaneity are described (helping co-workers, protecting the organization, making constructive suggestions, developing oneself, and spreading goodwill). Organizational spontaneity is compared with the seemingly analogous constructs of organizational citizenship behavior and prosocial organizational behavior. Based on a selective review of the literature, a multilevel model of spontaneity is presented. Positive mood at work is a pivotal construct in the model and posited as the direct precursor of organizational spontaneity. Primary work-group characteristics, the affective tone of the primary work group, affective disposition, life event history, and contextual characteristics are proposed to have direct or indirect effects, or both, on positive mood at work. Motivational bases of organizational spontaneity also are described. The model and its implications are discussed.

The word spontaneous is derived from the Latin sponte, which means of one’s free will or voluntarily. Katz (1964) uses the word spontaneous to describe one of three types of behavioral patterns that he claims are essential for a functioning organization. The other two essential organizational behaviors are attracting and holding people in the system and dependable role performance. Organizational psychologists, primarily through focusing their research on turnover and absenteeism and on job performance, have given these two other types of behavior considerable attention. Only very recently have spontaneous behaviors systematically entered into the field of inquiry. That is, certain forms of spontaneity have been investigated recently under the labels of prosocial organizational behavior (Brief & Motowildo, 1986) and organizational citizenship behavior (Organ, 1988a). Although both of these constructs overlap (albeit in different ways) with Katz’s (1964) notion of spontaneous behavior, neither of them adequately captures the distinct class of behaviors Katz was referring to, and neither construct is embedded in an adequately articulated nomological network.

Our intent here is to increase our understanding of organizational spontaneity and to propose a set of dispositional and situational factors contributing to its occurrence. To accomplish this aim, a number of seemingly unrelated bodies of psychological literature are reviewed selectively. A pivotal construct in the model and focus for the literature reviewed is mood at work. Because mood at work has not often been considered by organizational psychologists, we pay particularly careful attention to its exposition in the article.1

The rest of our article unfolds as follows. First, after Katz (1964), the organizational spontaneity construct is defined. We then compare spontaneity with the seemingly analogous constructs of prosocial organizational behavior and organizational

---

1 As George (1989) has indicated, mood at work is conceptually distinct from the often studied construct, job satisfaction. Attitudes such as job satisfaction have been considered to comprise at least two components, an affective component and a cognitive component (Bagozzi & Burnkrant, 1979, 1985). Conceptual (e.g., Organ & Near, 1985) and empirical (e.g., Brief & Roberson, 1989) work as examinations of existing measures of job satisfaction suggests that job satisfaction theory and research have tended to be more concerned with cognition. For example, Brief and Roberson (1989) found that three popular job satisfaction measures, the Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire (Weiss, Dawis, England, & Lofquist, 1967), the Job Descriptive Index (P. C. Smith, Kendall, & Hulin, 1969), and the Faces Scale (Kunin, 1955) contained more cognitive than affective content. In addition, mood at work is distinguishable from the affective component of job satisfaction in that mood is concerned with affect at work rather than affect about or toward work, which probably has more cognitive underpinnings (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982). Note that we do not mean to imply that mood at work and job satisfaction are completely independent; rather, mood at work and job satisfaction are conceptually distinct and sufficiently nonoverlapping to be considered distinct constructs, each worthy of investigation in its own right (George, 1989; Isen & Baron, 1991). In support of this view, Abelson et al. found that affective reports are distinct from semantic judgments, the latter being somewhat akin to traditional job satisfaction indexes. In addition, their reasoning suggests that mood at work is probably less cognitively filtered than job satisfaction.
citizenship behavior. This is followed by the presentation of a multilevel (individual, group, and organizational) model of the antecedents of organizational spontaneity.

Organizational Spontaneity

Katz (1964) asserts that "an organization which depends solely upon its blueprints of prescribed behavior is a very fragile social system" (p. 132). He goes on to describe five behaviors not specified by role prescriptions that, nevertheless, facilitate the accomplishment of organizational goals. These five behaviors are what we refer to as organizational spontaneity. Although the word spontaneity can refer to impulsive acts, our use of it here does not preclude acts preceded by forethought. Essentially, after Katz (1964), we view spontaneous behaviors as extra-role behaviors that are performed voluntarily and that contribute to organizational effectiveness. Our interpretation of the five forms of organizational spontaneity follows.

Forms of Organizational Spontaneity

Helping co-workers. Calling attention to a potential error, sharing supplies, and coming to the aid of someone behind in their work are a few of the many ways individuals can act voluntarily to help co-workers perform their assigned tasks. These helping behaviors are voluntary (i.e., spontaneous) in that they appear in no job description: They are not planned for or assigned as requirements of the job. These everyday acts, if they occur, often are taken for granted. Their absence, however, may explain the process by which seemingly minor difficulties at work (e.g., a worker being out of supplies) result in more serious organizational liabilities (e.g., the production line being called to a halt).

Protecting the organization. Fire, theft, vandalism, and innumerable sorts of accidents potentially can threaten organizational functioning. By reporting a fire hazard, by alerting building security to a door that should be locked and is not, or by disobeying an order that could lead to someone being injured, workers reduce the risks of damage, loss, or destruction. With very few exceptions (e.g., in security work per se), there is little in the role prescriptions of workers that requires that they be on watch to save life and property in the organization; yet, of course, without such voluntary responsiveness, the organization faces an increased likelihood of experiencing a disaster.

Making constructive suggestions. Rarely is the task assigned to a worker to be innovative, to make creative suggestions for improving the functioning of the organization. As Katz and Kahn (1978) indicate, although "some organizations encourage their members to feed constructive suggestions into the system, . . . coming up with good ideas for the organization and presenting them to management is not the typical job of the worker" (p. 404). Nonetheless, such spontaneous suggestions occur in some organizations and lead to improvements. Those organizations not benefiting from a stream of such essentially unprogrammable behaviors, in essence, are ineffectual in the use of their human resources.

Developing oneself. An often overlooked form of organizational spontaneity entails workers voluntarily seeking to enhance the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform better their current jobs or to prepare themselves for more responsible positions within the organization. This self-development may range from an aspiring manager subscribing to a business periodical to a production worker enrolling in a computer literacy course at the local community college. Whatever the developmental activity, it is distinguished by being beyond the call of duty (e.g., a worker taking a training program at her own expense and on her own time) and by its potential benefit to the organization (e.g., in the face of a shortage of managerial talent, a worker having groomed himself or herself for promotion to a supervisory position).

Spreading goodwill. When workers tell their friends how happy they are to work for a company that treats its employees so well and when they let their acquaintances know what a good product their firm sells, they are spreading the goodwill of their organization. Such acts can benefit organizations in a number of ways, including facilitating the recruitment of employees and the marketing of goods or services. But, once again, we claim that they are spontaneous and rarely represent an assigned task.

To reiterate, five forms of organizational spontaneity are proposed. Definitionally, each of these forms is a voluntary act that facilitates the accomplishment of organizational goals. Each of these forms is typically outside the primary content dimensions of an individual's job (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Moreover, the need for these behaviors arises from the fact that organizations cannot predict all contingencies in advance and face considerable uncertainty (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Hence, although an organization cannot specify which spontaneous behaviors will be required in any given situation and who should perform them, it is dependent, nonetheless, on their occurrence. Below, we compare and contrast the organizational spontaneity construct with the constructs of organizational citizenship behavior and prosocial organizational behavior. (For a comparison of the latter two constructs, see Van Dyne & Cummings, 1990.)

Organizational Spontaneity Compared With Citizenship Behavior

Organ (1988a) asserts that organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) represents individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization. (p. 4)

(Also see Organ, 1988b, and Organ, 1990) Thus, OCB is like organizational spontaneity in that it also is defined as voluntary (discretionary) and as improving the functioning of organizations. However, it conceptually differs from organizational spontaneity in the prohibition Organ has placed on the direct or formal recompense by the organization's reward system. For instance, if an organization had the policy of financially rewarding those who made cost-saving suggestions, the act of making such a constructive suggestion would not qualify as an OCB, but it would qualify as a form of organizational spontaneity. Likewise, providers of creative ideas for improvements in an organization may receive financial remuneration for their contributions, yet although these behaviors would not be considered OCB, they do reflect voluntary actions that contribute to
effectiveness and are usually beyond formal role requirements (Katz & Kahn, 1978). That is, our view of what constitutes organizational spontaneity solely is dependent on the behavior being outside the worker's prescribed role and beneficial to the organization and not on the potential incentive value of the behavior to the individual. To us, the latter is a motivational issue and to consider it in defining organizational spontaneity would too severely limit the scope of the construct. Hence, although OCB certainly includes some forms of spontaneity, it excludes other forms.

Another way of examining the domain overlap of the OCB and organizational spontaneity constructs is to compare the forms of OCB identified by Organ (1988a) with the forms of organizational spontaneity we previously articulated. The first form of OCB noted by Organ (1988a) is altruism, which includes “all discretionary behaviors that have the effect of helping a specific other person with an organizationally relevant task or problem” (p. 8). This form of OCB, more than any other, appears to be similar to a particular form of organizational spontaneity: helping co-workers. We prefer our label for capturing these common behaviors simply because the term altruism implies a given motivational set (Sorrentino & Rushton, 1981) and this represents a restriction, as noted above, which we wish to avoid. The second form of OCB is conscientiousness; it refers to organization members carrying out some of their role requirements far beyond the minimum necessary. The role behaviors Organ (1988a) addresses involve, for example, attendance, cleanliness, punctuality, use of break time, meeting deadlines, and adherence to rules. Conscientiousness does not seem to overlap with any form of organizational spontaneity. This is so because of its focus on role adherence and, thus, on prescribed role behaviors. Organ (1988a) himself recognized this by stating that only the level or intensity of the behaviors denoting conscientiousness distinguishes them from dependable role performance. Therefore, we find it more parsimonious to construe conscientiousness as representing a high level of a facet of job performance rather than as a form of voluntary action.

Sportsmanship is the third form of OCB identified by Organ (1988a). It entails avoiding “complaining, petty grievances, railing against real or imagined slights, and making federal cases out of small potatoes” (Organ, 1988a, p. 11). It, too, does not appear to overlap with any form of organizational spontaneity. The most obvious reason for this is that Organ (1988a) has characterized sportsmanship in terms of the absence of dysfunctional behaviors rather than the voluntary performance of functional ones. The fourth form of OCB is courtesy, which refers to “touching base with those parties whose work would be affected by one's decisions or commitments” (Organ, 1988a, p. 12). Although the phrase touching base suggests that acts of courtesy are informal, at least some of the behavioral examples supplied by Organ imply a more formal, in-role nature. For instance, some of Organ's examples are giving advance notice, reminding, passing along information, consulting, and briefing. Thus, the degree to which courtesy, in fact, denotes a set of spontaneous organizational behaviors is open to question; rather, several of the behavioral examples of courtesy could be governed by standard operating procedures dictated by written rules and policies or by historical precedent. Those examples of courtesy perhaps more voluntary in nature (e.g., reminding) seem to be most indicative of the helping co-workers form of organizational spontaneity. Given the fuzzy status of the voluntary nature of courtesy, we prefer the inclusion of spontaneous acts of touching base along with other ways of helping co-workers.

Civic virtue, initially identified by Graham (1986), is the final form of OCB mentioned by Organ (1988a). This form refers to responsibly participating in the political life of the organization; examples of it include attending meetings, reading internal mail, discussing issues on personal time, and speaking up. Our problem with civic virtue is the same one we have with conscientiousness and courtesy: Such acts as attending meetings and reading internal mail arguably are not spontaneous. This difficulty with certain forms of OCB is recognized by Organ (1988a). He suggests that an initial option for managing OCB is to define it away by attempting to prescribe the behaviors. Hence, although there is a certain degree of overlap between OCB and Katz's (1964) notion of spontaneous behaviors (e.g., both include helping co-workers), OCB includes other behaviors that clearly do not reflect organizational spontaneity. Moreover, the OCB construct does not explicitly take into account certain forms of organizational spontaneity (e.g., protecting the organization and developing oneself).

Organizational Spontaneity Compared With Prosocial Behavior

Brief and Motowidlo (1986) defined prosocial organizational behavior (POB) as

behavior which is (a) performed by a member of an organization, (b) directed toward an individual, group or organization with whom he or she interacts while carrying out his or her organizational role, and (c) performed with the intention of promoting the welfare of the individual, group, or organization toward which it is directed. (p. 711)

They go on to say that their definition of POB is deliberately broad. What we find most troublesome about the POB construct is this breadth. Simply put, POB encompasses organizational spontaneity as well as numerous other behavioral patterns that could include, for instance, role-prescribed behaviors and behaviors that make it more difficult for the organization to be effective. Examples of POBs that generally tend to be dysfunctional for the organization include helping co-workers achieve personal goals inconsistent with organizational objectives, being lenient in personnel decisions, and delivering services or products to customers or clients in an organizationally inconsistent manner (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986). Because our current intent is to theorize about the causes of organizationally helpful, voluntary acts, focusing on the POB construct clearly is unacceptable. It is quite plausible that the causes of organizational spontaneity may be quite different than those of some other facets of POB. However, once again, note that certain forms of POB would definitely qualify as spontaneous behaviors.

Summary

Organizational spontaneity entered the literature more than a quarter of a century ago. Although its relationship to organiza-
tional effectiveness is an intuitively obvious one, the field, only within recent years, has awakened to its importance. This awakening was stimulated by the introduction of two constructs, OCB and POB, which seemed to be analogous to organizational spontaneity. We have demonstrated, however, that both of these alternatives do not adequately capture the nature of organizational spontaneity. In essence, the principal difficulty of both OCB and POB is that they include behavioral patterns other than organizational spontaneity and, in the case of OCB, exclude certain forms of spontaneity. More specifically, the POB construct is so broad that it includes almost any behavior a worker could perform as long as that behavior is perceived by the worker as benefiting or helping others (even if the recipient of the helpful behavior is one of the organization's competitors). Hence, behaviors falling in the domain of POB are not necessarily functional for the organization and may be detrimental. Although the OCB construct avoids this problem, it too includes behaviors that are not in the domain of organizational spontaneity (e.g., conscientiousness and sportsmanship) and also excludes certain forms of spontaneity. In terms of the latter, if an individual received financial remuneration for a new idea or constructive suggestion, this would not qualify as an OCB; however, this behavior would fall in the domain of organizational spontaneity because it is necessary for organizational functioning but often is not or cannot be prescribed in advance. Additionally, the five forms of OCB identified by Organ (1988a) do not explicitly capture certain dimensions of spontaneity (e.g., protecting the organization and developing oneself).

Above, we have shown how organizational spontaneity differs from OCB and POB by comparing the specific types of behavior each construct includes and excludes. It also is possible to abstract from such an analysis the basic dimensions along which the three constructs vary. As indicated in Table 1, the three constructs differ along four dimensions. The first dimension is concerned with the functionality of the behavior for the organization. Whereas both OCB and organizational spontaneity include only organizationally functional behaviors, POB includes behaviors that are dysfunctional for the employing organization (e.g., providing services or products to consumers in organizationally inconsistent ways). The second dimension refers to whether the behavior is role prescribed or extra role. Whereas organizational spontaneity principally includes only extra-role behaviors that cannot be or usually are not prescribed in advance (Katz, 1964), both POB and OCB include some behaviors that would normally be considered role prescribed. For example, the "providing services or products to consumers in organizationally consistent ways" (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986, p. 713) form of POB and the conscientiousness form of OCB (e.g., attendance and punctuality) are often role-prescribed behaviors. The next dimension refers to whether the behavior can be recognized by the organization's reward system. Whereas workers can receive financial remuneration for both POB and forms of organizational spontaneity, OCB excludes any behaviors that are recognized by the organization's formal reward system. The last dimension refers to the extent to which the constructs include both active and passive behaviors. Whereas the organizational spontaneity construct includes only active behaviors, both POB and OCB tend to include both active and passive behaviors. Examples of such passive behaviors include the "staying with the organization despite temporary hardships" (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986, p. 716) form of POB and the sportsmanship dimension (e.g., avoiding complaining) dimension of OCB.

Hence, although there is a certain degree of overlap among these three constructs, some of the forms of organizational spontaneity are not captured by OCB, and both OCB and POB include behaviors that are inconsistent with Katz's (1964) notion of spontaneous behavior. Essentially, POB, OCB, and organizational spontaneity vary along the dimensions discussed above and indicated in Table 1.

As has been frequently noted, the various forms of organizational spontaneity are central to the survival and effectiveness of organizations (e.g., Blau, 1973; Katz & Kahn, 1978; March & Simon, 1958; Mouzelis, 1969). Essentially, as Katz (1964) has indicated,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavioral dimension</th>
<th>OCB</th>
<th>POB</th>
<th>Organizational spontaneity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizationally functional-</td>
<td>Includes functional behaviors</td>
<td>Includes functional and dysfunctional behaviors</td>
<td>Includes functional behaviors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizationally disfunctional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role prescribed-extra role</td>
<td>Includes role-prescribed and extra-role behaviors</td>
<td>Includes role-prescribed and extra-role behaviors</td>
<td>Includes extra-role behaviors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility of financial</td>
<td>Behaviors cannot be recognized by formal reward system</td>
<td>Behaviors can be recognized by formal reward system</td>
<td>Behaviors can be recognized by formal reward system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>renumeration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active-passive</td>
<td>Includes active and passive behaviors</td>
<td>Includes active and passive behaviors</td>
<td>Includes active behaviors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. OCB = organizational citizenship behavior, POB = prosocial organizational behavior.
no organizational planning can foresee all contingencies within its operation, or can anticipate with perfect accuracy all environmental changes, or can control perfectly all human variability. The resources of people in innovation, in spontaneous cooperation, or helping co-workers, in protective and creative behavior are thus vital to organizational survival and effectiveness (p. 132). Likewise, organizational effectiveness also is dependent on organizational members spontaneously spreading goodwill and engaging in self-development and training (Katz, 1964).

Antecedents of Organizational Spontaneity

What influences a person to help a co-worker, make a constructive suggestion, spread goodwill, or engage in some other form of organizational spontaneity? Building on Katz's (1964) tentative answer to this question, we begin to outline a more detailed theory of organizational spontaneity. It is more detailed than Katz's effort in several ways:

1. Katz postulated organizational spontaneity to be driven by forces stemming from two different levels of analysis, the organization and the primary work group. To these levels we add a third, the individual.
2. Whereas Katz merely mentions the potential importance of mood, it takes on a central, psychological role in our thinking. Moreover, our conceptual scheme explicitly draws on prior research demonstrating the relative independence of positive mood and negative mood. We propose positive mood to be a primary determinant of organizational spontaneity.
3. We, like Katz, place a special emphasis on the role of the primary work group. But, unlike Katz, we postulate the particular characteristics of a work group that lead it to become a driving force behind organizational spontaneity.

As we specify our model, these differences and their saliency for understanding organizational spontaneity will become more apparent. For now, we turn to the key construct in our model of spontaneity, positive mood at work.

Mood at Work

As indicated above and in Figure 1, positive mood at work is a direct antecedent of organizational spontaneity and a pivotal construct in our model. Thus, we go into some detail in, first, describing the construct and, second, discussing its hypothesized relationship with organizational spontaneity. Mood at work refers to affective states that are encountered on the job. Mood at work is pervasive (Brady, 1970; Nowlis, 1970; Ryle, 1950) in that it is not focused on any particular object, event, individual, or behavior. Moods do not demand complete attention, nor do they necessarily interrupt ongoing thought processes and behaviors (M. S. Clark & Isen, 1982). Rather, moods provide the affective coloring for day-to-day events.

Although moods do not noticeably interrupt cognitive processes and behavior, they do influence them; this influence may be particularly significant given the pervasiveness of moods and the fact that we probably are often unaware of the effects of our moods. In support of this, moods or feeling states have been demonstrated to have profound effects on thought processes, attitudes, and behaviors (e.g., Bower, 1981; Bower & Cohen, 1982; M. S. Clark & Isen, 1982; Isen & Shalker, 1982; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Leventhal & Tomarken, 1986; Rosenhan, Salovey, & Hargis, 1981; Rosenhan, Salovey, Karylowski, & Hargis, 1981; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979); moods are significant determinants of our impressions of the world around us and our actions (M. S. Clark & Isen, 1982). M. S. Clark (1982) suggests that "there is now little doubt that subtle feeling states, or . . . moods, are capable of influencing a wide variety of judgments and behaviors" (p. 264). For example, people in good moods are more likely to be helpful (e.g., Rosenhan et al., 1981), recall positive experiences (e.g., Bower, 1981), and provide higher ratings of the quality of consumer products (Isen et al., 1978) than people who are not feeling good. Because moods have been demonstrated to have such extensive effects in general, it is highly plausible that they also have profound effects on thought processes and behavior at work and in organizational settings.

On the basis of a growing body of research (e.g., Warr, Barter, & Brownbridge, 1983; Watson, 1988a), rather than viewing mood as a unidimensional construct ranging from positive to negative or good to bad, we suggest here that mood at work be viewed in terms of two dimensions, positive mood and negative mood. A substantial body of literature suggests that mood is most appropriately characterized by two dominant and independent dimensions rather than one dimension (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1980; Diener & Emmons, 1984; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1984, 1988; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989; Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Zevon & Tellegen, 1982). The two dimensions have been demonstrated to have different correlates (e.g., Watson & Clark, 1984) and antecedents (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1980; Warr et al., 1983) and to be differentially related to life events (Zautra, 1983).

As Watson et al. (1988, p. 1063) indicate, these “two dominant dimensions consistently emerge in studies of affective structure, both in the United States and in a number of other cultures” (p. 1063). Examples of evidence supporting the validity of the bidimensional conceptualization of mood include the fact that positive and negative mood have differential relationships with various personality traits (Tellegen, 1985) and that they are related to different types of daily activities. For instance, positive mood has been found to be related to social interaction, but negative mood has been found to be unrelated to social activity (e.g., L. A. Clark & Watson, 1988) and positively related to aggression under certain circumstances (Berkowitz, 1989). Moreover, on the basis of their reanalysis of studies of self-report mood, Watson and Tellegen (1985) indicate that positive and negative mood are consistently found to be the first two rotated dimensions in orthogonal factor analyses of self-report mood or the first two second-order factors in oblique analyses. This bidimensional structure of affect also has been found in other types of mood research (not involving self-report), such as the analysis of facial expressions and tones of voice (Watson & Clark, 1984). The independence of positive and negative mood and their differential relationships with various antecedents and consequences have important implications for the field of organizational behavior in general (e.g., George, 1989) and the organizational spontaneity construct in particular, as becomes clearer below.

Each dimension of mood can be characterized by the sort of engagement involved, with engagement denoting not only the type of mood experienced but also characteristic cognitive
styles and relationships with the environment (Tellegen, 1985). As described by Tellegen, a high positive mood denotes pleasurable or positive engagement, and a low positive mood reflects sadness and lethargy (Watson et al., 1988). Mood terms such as active, elated, enthusiastic, excited, peppy, and strong best characterize a state of high positive mood, whereas low positive mood is indicated by terms such as drowsy, dull, sleepy, and sluggish (Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Likewise, high negative mood indicates a state of unpleasurable engagement reflected in terms such as distressed, fearful, hostile, jittery, nervous, and scornful, and a low negative mood encompasses states of calmness and serenity such as feeling calm, at rest, placid, and relaxed (Tellegen, 1985; Watson et al., 1988; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). These dimensions can be thought of as "descriptively bipolar but affectively unipolar" (Zevon & Tellegen, 1982, p. 112) because the poles of each dimension reflect the presence or absence of the mood state. That is, the high pole of each dimension reflects a more engaged or aroused mood state, and the low pole signifies a relative lack of engagement or arousal. To sum up, high negative affective states are characterized by subjective distress, unpleasurable engagement, and nervousness, and low negative affective states are reflective of feeling calm and relaxed (Watson et al., 1988). High positive affective states are characterized by enthusiasm, high energy, activity, and pleasurable engagement, and low positive affective states are characterized by sadness and lethargy (Watson et al., 1988).

Although there may be some resistance to this view in the light of the history of Herzberg's (1966) somewhat similar formulations, extensive empirical evidence suggests that mood is characterized by these two dominant dimensions (e.g., Watson, 1988a), as indicated above. In addition, positive mood and negative mood emerge as independent factors in a broad range of types of mood measures and, thus, are not found to be independent only when using a particular measurement technique; a criticism that has been leveled at Herzberg's work (Watson, Pennebaker, & Folger, 1987). As Watson et al. (1987) suggest, "one can be critical of Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory and yet at the same time endorse a two-factor structure of affect" (pp. 153-154). Hence, although there are well-known problems with Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory, to the extent that job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction tap positive mood at work and negative mood at work, respectively, he may have been on target in asserting that satisfaction and dissatisfaction are independent and caused by different factors.

Note that although positive and negative mood are relatively independent of each other even for very short time periods (e.g., Watson, 1988b; Watson et al., 1988), people do not simultaneously experience positive and negative affective states at intense levels (Diener & Iran-Nejad, 1986). Hence, we would not expect a person who is in an intensely positive affective state at work to simultaneously experience an intensely negative affective state.

In further support of a bidimensional mood conceptualization, it has been suggested that positive mood and negative mood are associated with different types of brain activity. Tucker and Williamson's (1984) model of hemispheric specialization suggests that the experience of positive moods is associated with activity in the left-lateralized (dopaminergic) activation system and the experience of positive moods is associated with activity in the right-lateralized (noradrenergic) arousal system. Empirical support for the physiological underpinning of a bidimensional mood structure has been obtained (e.g., Maas, Dekirmenjian, & Fawcett, 1974; Shapiro, 1965). Although the bidimensional structure of mood appears to be commonly accepted in the literature (e.g., Watson & Tellegen, 1985), some preliminary results suggest that the dimensionality of mood at work may be somewhat more complex (Burke, Brief, George, Roberson, & Webster, 1989).

Why do we expect positive mood at work to have a major impact on organizational spontaneity? Probably the clearest
way to answer this question is to discuss the hypothesized effects of positive mood at work on each of the five forms of organizational spontaneity described above.

**Helping co-workers.** Numerous social psychological studies have demonstrated that helping behaviors (or prosocial behaviors, as they are commonly labeled in this literature) are fostered by positive mood states (e.g., Aderman, 1972; Cunningham, Steinberg, & Grev, 1980; Isen, Clark, & Schwartz, 1976; Isen & Levin, 1972; Levin & Isen, 1975; Rosenhan, Salovey, & Hargis, 1981). If one assumes that job satisfaction is an indicator of mood at work, then the finding that satisfaction indexes are significantly related to prosocial behaviors in work contexts (e.g., Bateman & Organ, 1983; Motowidlo, 1984; Motowidlo, Packard, & Manning, 1988; Puffer, 1987; Scholl, Cooper, & McKenna, 1987; C. A. Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983) is consistent with the findings from the social psychological studies. However, Organ (1988a) pointed out that it is not clear whether the satisfaction–prosocial behavior relationship is due to the effects of positive mood or positive job-related cognitions. In a recent study of OCB, Organ and Konovsky (1989) set out to determine if these behaviors are cognitively or affectively driven. Their results favored the cognitive interpretation. However, this finding should be interpreted in light of several factors. First, Organ and Konovsky may have been measuring positive mood as a trait rather than as a state. More specifically, Organ and Konovsky asked respondents to describe their typical mood at work during the past 6 months. Watson et al. (1988) indicate that when mood ratings of relatively long time periods (e.g., past few months or past year) are taken, the ratings are sufficiently stable to be used as trait measures of mood. However, positive mood as a state influences prosocial responding rather than the more generalized tendency to experience the mood state (i.e., the trait, George, 1991). Second, George (1991) found that although state positive mood was a significant predictor of helpful behavior directed at customers, trait positive mood was not, even though trait positive mood predicted state positive mood. Finally, as indicated previously, an extensive body of literature supports the proposition that positive moods promote helping behavior. At this point, it is probably safest to conclude that additional research is needed that explores these issues in organizational contexts. Also note that studies of the relationships between variables having some degree of affective content and OCB and POB have generally found these variables to not account for especially large amounts of variance in OCB or POB; however, the limited number of these studies, the fact that they did not measure organizational spontaneity, and the fact that in many cases, the predictors were not pure indicators of positive affect or mood also suggest the need for further research.

Several different explanations have been offered for the finding that good moods promote helpfulness. Carlson, Charlin, and Miller (1988) reviewed the literature relevant to these hypotheses. Several of the explanations for the mood-helping behavior link discussed by Carlson et al. (1988) are relevant here. For example, being in a positive mood results in people perceiving things in a more positive light (Bower, 1981; Carson & Adams, 1980; D. M. Clark & Teasdale, 1985; Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). One explanation for this finding comes from work on human memory: People are posited to store material in memory partly on the basis of its affective tone. A positive mood serves as a cue that increases the probability that positive affect and cognitions are generated for other stimuli. In other words, mood congruent material is more accessible from memory (Bower & Cohen, 1982); thus, positive moods cue the recall of positive material (Isen et al., 1978). This process is referred to as priming (A. S. Brown, 1979; Neely, 1976, 1977). Through priming, an individual in a positive mood is more likely to feel positively toward co-workers and opportunities for helping and, hence, is more likely to be helpful. Consistent with this reasoning, it has been suggested that good moods result in an enhanced social outlook, again facilitating helpfulness (Carlson et al., 1988).

People in positive moods also are more likely to be attracted to others (e.g., Bell, 1978; Gouaux, 1971; Mehrabian & Russell, 1975), and it has been suggested that the attractiveness of the recipient increases the rate of helping (e.g., Daniels & Berkwitz, 1963; Gross, Wallston, & Piliavin, 1975). Finally, helping may be self-reinforcing. That is, people in positive moods consciously strive to maintain their positive feelings (M. S. Clark & Isen, 1982). It has been suggested that positive moods foster helpfulness because helping is seen as a way to maintain positive moods (Carlson et al., 1988). Thus, the relative robustness of the positive mood–helping behavior relationship (Isen & Baron, 1991), as well as the theoretical rationales underlying it, suggests that workers in positive moods are more likely to be helpful to co-workers.

**Protecting the organization.** As mentioned above, people consciously strive to experience positive mood states and to avoid negative mood states (M. S. Clark & Isen, 1982). Likewise when a person is in a positive mood, there is a tendency to try to maintain the mood (Carlson et al., 1988). Hence, when people feel in a good mood at work, they try to maintain their positive feelings. One way in which positive moods at work can be maintained is through protecting the organization. Fire, theft, vandalism, and other sorts of accidents or problems that can threaten an organization are likely to be seen by people as threats to their positive feelings at work. By protecting the organization, the worker in a positive mood helps to ensure that his or her own good mood is maintained.

**Making constructive suggestions.** Positive moods have been shown to facilitate creativity (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). When positive moods are induced in people, they tend to make more connections and integrations of divergent stimulus materials and produce more innovative solutions to problems (Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen et al., 1987; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985). People in positive moods apparently use broader categories (Isen & Daubman, 1984) and see more interrelatedness among stimuli (Isen et al., 1987). Moreover, in negotiation contexts, positive moods have been shown to lead to more integrative solutions being reached and more constructive and cooperative bargaining (Carnevale & Isen, 1986). Hence, workers in positive mood states are likely to be more innovative and creative. These spontaneous acts are hypothesized to result in people who experience positive moods at work making more and better constructive suggestions.

**Developing oneself** As indicated above, moods (a) affect the saliency and processing of mood congruent stimuli, (b) affect
the ease of retrieval from memory with mood congruent material being more accessible, and (c) influence thinking and judgment (Bower & Cohen, 1982). Consistent with these findings, individuals in positive moods tend to perceive that they have higher probabilities of success (e.g., J. D. Brown, 1984) and that they are, in fact, more successful (e.g., Wright & Mischel, 1982). These influences should result in people in positive moods feeling more self-confident, self-efficacious, and capable. Just as individuals in positive moods evaluate co-workers more positively, they are likely to evaluate themselves in a more favorable light as well. Hence, they are likely to have higher aspirations and engage in more self-development activities. Positive self-evaluations are also likely to lead to greater persistence in self-development activities (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Indirect support for this proposition comes from Bandura's (1982, 1986) work, which suggests that people approach tasks they feel they are capable of and avoid tasks that they feel are threatening. Self-development opportunities are also evaluated more positively by people in positive moods because positive moods cause judgments of stimuli, in general, to be more favorable.

Spreading goodwill. If positive moods are experienced at work, the organization and its products are more likely to be evaluated positively through the effects of priming. People who experience positive moods at work are more likely to evaluate the organization favorably and, hence, spread goodwill.

Another means through which positive moods may facilitate the spreading of goodwill is implied by the work of Zajonc (1980). Zajonc suggests that affective reactions may stimulate cognitive processing to justify the reactions. For example, if an individual generally feels good at work, he or she may cognitively justify this feeling by thinking about all the positive aspects of the job, the organization, or its products. These favorable evaluations may result in more goodwill being spread.

A final mechanism through which positive moods may foster the spreading of goodwill comes from the finding that positive moods and social engagement or interaction are related positively (Watson, 1988a). In discussing the direction of causality in this observed relationship, Watson (1988a) suggests that positive mood and social engagement may be reciprocally related. Relevant here is the notion that people are more likely to engage in social activity when they are in a positive mood (Rossi & Rossi, 1977). In organizations, some and perhaps most of this interaction is with other members of the organization. However, a certain amount of interaction quite likely involves people outside the organization. Hence, people in good moods may have higher levels of interaction with people outside the organization; the organization-relevant content of these interactions is likely to be favorable to the organization because of the processes discussed above. Again, this should result in individuals in positive moods at work being more likely to spread goodwill.

Summary. All in all, positive mood states are proposed to facilitate or foster the five forms of organizational spontaneity. Notably absent from this discussion has been any mention of the influences of negative moods on organizational spontaneity. The influence of negative moods on behaviors like these is much less clear-cut. Generally, relationships have either been nonexistent, inconsistent across studies, or uninterpretable. For example, in trying to explain the relation between negative mood and helping, Carlson and Miller (1987) indicate that negative mood has been found to increase helpfulness (e.g., Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; Donnerstein, Donnerstein, & Munger, 1975), decrease helpfulness (e.g., Moore, Underwood, & Rosenhan, 1973; Underwood et al., 1977), and be unrelated to helpfulness (e.g., Harris & Siebal, 1975; Holloway, Tucker, & Hornstein, 1977). Negative moods have been found to be systematically related to certain types of behaviors (e.g., reporting somatic complaints), but these behaviors are generally not that relevant to the construct of organizational spontaneity. Thus, we consider positive mood states to be the force behind organizational spontaneity. This does not mean that researchers should completely abandon negative mood in the study of spontaneity, because this is probably premature. All we are suggesting is that positive mood states are of primary importance and the effects of negative moods may be more ambiguous, less clear-cut, or more indirect. In fact, under certain circumstances, people in negative moods may be more inclined toward what could be called antisocial behaviors, such as aggression (Berkowitz, 1989).

Given the hypothesized importance of positive mood states for organizational spontaneity, we now turn to the antecedents of positive mood at work. More specifically, we review and discuss individual, group, and organizational determinants of spontaneity that operate through their direct effects on positive mood.

Individual-Level Antecedents of Positive Mood at Work

The individual antecedents that are key determinants of positive mood at work are affective disposition and life event history. These individual factors are expected to influence organizational spontaneity through their direct effects on positive mood.

Affective disposition. A growing body of evidence suggests that positive and negative moods are differentially associated with various personality traits. For example, positive moods tend to be associated with traits such as sociability, extraversion, and social boldness (Costa & McCrae, 1984; Emmons, 1986). Although various traits may be correlated with positive moods, it would seem that there should be some overarching personality factor that subsumes these perhaps more limited dispositions and also is a key determinant of positive mood. The personality trait positive affectivity (PA) appears to capture this essence. Tellegen (1982, 1985) characterizes the individual high on this dimension to have an overall sense of well-being, viewing the self as pleasurably and effectively engaged in terms of both interpersonal relations and achievement. Such people view themselves as self-efficacious and tend to experience more positive emotions and mood states than people low on this trait. Conversely, people low on PA do not see themselves as pleasurably engaged, do not feel self-efficacious, and have a weak sense of overall well-being (Tellegen, 1985). Hence, it is hypothesized that the experience of positive moods at work is influenced by the personality trait PA.

Preliminary research suggests that this is indeed the case.

---

2 For an alternative, more microscopic, control-process viewpoint, see Carver and Scheier (1990).
For example, George (1989) found PA to be positively related to positive mood at work in a retail setting. In addition and lending further support for the independence of positive and negative moods, whereas PA has been found to be positively associated with positive mood states, it is virtually unrelated to negative mood states (Tellegen, 1982).

To avoid a possible source of confusion, the distinction between PA as a trait and positive moods as affective states should be reemphasized. As mentioned above, PA is an enduring personality trait that predisposes people to experience positive emotions and moods as well as to have a positive outlook and orientation. Positive moods, on the other hand, refer to more transient affective states: positive moods are determined by both personality and situational factors. The fact that a person is high in PA does not ensure that the person will experience positive moods in a given context (e.g., work), just as the fact that a person is low in PA does not necessarily imply that he or she will not experience positive moods in a given context. All else equal, high-PA persons do tend to experience more positive moods than low-PA persons. However, note that PA as a trait is quite distinct from positive mood as a state.

Consistent with this trait–state distinction, Watson and Pennebaker (1989) indicate that positive mood can be measured as a state or a trait: The state captures how one feels at given points in time, whereas the trait represents stable individual differences in the level of positive mood generally experienced. Hence, positive mood as a state refers to moods that are experienced in the short run and fluctuate over time, whereas the trait (i.e., PA) refers to stable individual differences in levels of positive affect (Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). This trait longevity and state variability are reflected in the differential test–retest reliabilities found for measures of PA (the trait) and positive mood states (Meyer & Shack, 1989). As Watson and Pennebaker (1989) indicate, "trait PA is a... predisposition conducive to positive emotional experience; it reflects a generalized sense of well-being and competence, and of effective interpersonal engagement" (p. 347).

A key point is that although PA influences positive mood states, moods also are influenced by situational factors. So, high-PA persons do not always experience positive moods. Likewise, being low PA does not imply that one is never in a positive mood. In our model, PA (the trait) influences positive mood (the state); however, the state is the direct precursor to organizational spontaneity, not the trait. More generally, whereas the trait influences the state, the state initiates behavior. Hence, for example, George (1991) hypothesized and found that although PA was significantly correlated with state positive mood, state positive mood was a significant predictor of customer service behavior, whereas PA (the trait) was not. As Nesselroade (1988) has suggested, "the distinction between trait-like and state-like dimensions of individual differences has long been recognized [and] that [the] state mediates behavior in important ways seem well established" (p. 163). A case in point is the distinction between state and trait anxiety reflected in the popular State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (Speilberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; Tellegen, 1985; Usala & Hertzog, 1991).

Given that PA (the trait) and positive mood (the state) are conceptually and empirically distinct and the state is the direct precursor to behavior, it may not be surprising that the trait and state can be measured independently and that reliable and valid measures of the trait and state exist that display expected relationships with other variables (i.e., convergent and discriminant validity) (e.g., Burke et al., 1989; George, 1989, 1991; Meyer & Shack, 1989; Tellegen, 1982, 1985; Watson, 1988a; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). PA can be assessed by measures of trait well-being and extraversion (Santer, Schaubroeck, Sime, & Hayes, 1990; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). In fact, Digman (1990) suggests that the first dimension in the robust five-factor model of personality is captured by measures of, for example, extraversion (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1985; Eysenck, 1970), surgency (e.g., Norman, 1963), and PA (e.g., Tellegen, 1982, 1985). The five-factor model has been shown to be valid for both peer ratings and self-ratings, and it is clear that PA is a core aspect of what has commonly been termed the Extraversion factor in the model (e.g., Tellegen, 1985; Watson & Clark, in press). A measure of PA that has demonstrated reliability and validity comes from Tellegen's (1982, 1985) Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ). The PA scale is a higher order factor scale of the MPQ calculated by regression estimates combining weighted raw scores on the 11 primary MPQ scales and a constant. Each item in the scale reflects a statement that a person could use to describe himself or herself, and respondents are asked to indicate whether the statement is true or false for them personally. The PA scale shows convergent and discriminant validity with respect to measures of mood states and measures of personality traits such as the Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Psychoticism scales of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) and the second-order Extraversion, Anxiety, and Superego Strength factor scores of Cattell's Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1970; Tellegen, 1982, 1985). In an organizational context, George (1989) found that PA measured by the MPQ was significantly and positively related to positive mood at work and unrelated to negative mood at work. Consistent with the trait–state distinction, the magnitude of the correlation between PA and positive mood found in that study ($r = .34, p \leq .01$) suggests that although the trait influences the state, the trait and state are distinguishable empirically. Also supportive of the state–trait distinction is the finding that positive mood states were predictive of absenteeism, whereas PA was not (George, 1989).

Note that use of the PA scale from the MPQ may not always be feasible because of its length (247 items). Fortunately, the MPQ also contains a much shorter (11-item) measure of PA, called the Positive Emotionality scale (PEN). Overall, the PEN scale has been shown to have acceptable internal consistency and test–retest reliabilities and demonstrates convergent and discriminant validity with regard to other variables (e.g., Watson, 1988a; Watson et al., 1988; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). Again consistent with the notion that the trait PA influences positive mood states and that the two are, in fact, distinguishable is the magnitude of the correlations George (1991) observed between the PEN and positive mood at work ($r = .40, p \leq .01$). Also bearing on the trait–state distinction (in particular, the assertion that the state mediates the effects of the trait on

---

3 For analogous findings regarding the distinction between state and trait anxiety, see, for example, Usala and Hertzog (1991).
behavior) is the finding that positive mood states were predictive of both extra-role and role-prescribed forms of POB, whereas PA was not.

An example of a measure of positive mood at work (the state) is the Job Affect Scale (JAS), developed by Brief et al. (1988) and subsequently modified by Burke et al. (1989). The content and format of the JAS are quite different from that of the two measures of PA described above. Essentially, the JAS consists of adjectives that are pure markers of positive and negative mood states (Watson & Tellegen, 1985), and respondents are asked to indicate the extent to which each adjective describes how they felt at work during the past week. The JAS was used to measure positive mood at work in the two studies discussed above (George, 1989, 1991). Again, results of these studies suggest that the positive mood scale of the JAS is related to both personality (in the form of PA) and behaviors (absence and POB) in expected directions. Moreover, the magnitude of the observed correlations between PA and positive mood state was not so high as to suggest that they are both tapping the same underlying construct; hence, although George (1989, 1991) found that PA accounted for approximately 12%–16% of the variance in positive mood at work, a large portion of the variance remained unaccounted for. This additional variance in the state (over and above that accounted for by the trait) is attributable to the influence of the situation and the Person × Situation interaction on the state.

Although the focus here is primarily on positive mood states, for the sake of completeness, the dispositional antecedent of negative mood states should be discussed. As in the case of positive mood, negative moods have been shown to be correlated with various personality traits such as neuroticism, impulsiveness, and aggressiveness (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1984). These various traits can be captured by the more general and pervasive trait of negative affectivity (NA; Watson, 1987; Watson & Clark, 1984). NA subsumes these various traits, but internal consistency estimates of NA measures tend to be very high, confirming its unitary nature. Moreover, considerable clinical and peer-rating data attest to the validity of such measures (Watson & Clark, 1984).

NA reflects a disposition to experience negative affective states (Tellegen, 1982; Watson & Clark, 1984). People high on NA tend to feel nervous, tense, anxious, worried, upset, and distressed. Such people are generally more likely to experience negative mood states and distress than people low on NA. People high on NA also are more likely to have a negative view of themselves, others, and the world around them and interpret ambiguous stimuli negatively (Goodstein, 1954; Haney, 1973; Phares, 1961). In summary, "the high-NA individuals are more likely to report distress, discomfort, and dissatisfaction over time and regardless of the situation, even in the absence of any overt or objective source of stress" (Watson & Clark, 1984, p. 483).

Thus, it is expected that the experience of negative mood at work is influenced by the personality trait NA. Recent work in organizational behavior suggests that people high on NA tend to experience more negative moods at work (Brief et al., 1988). Moreover, Brief et al. (1988) found that NA tends to be significantly associated with various indicators of distress at work and in life in general. Again, in support of the independence of positive and negative moods, NA has been shown to be virtually unrelated to positive mood (Tellegen, 1982).

At this point, the reader may be confused as to the difference between, for example, high PA and low NA. Although intuitively these two concepts may appear to be similar, conceptually and empirically they are distinct (Tellegen, 1985). That is, whereas the high-PA person has an overall sense of well-being, views the self as pleasurably engaged, and tends to experience positive moods, low NA merely signals the absence of a tendency to experience negative moods, feel distressed, view conditions negatively, and so forth. As this description implies, it is possible for a person to not feel distressed and unpleasantly aroused without experiencing a positive mood state. Watson and Clark (1984) clearly concur on this point; they suggest that "NA is unrelated to an individual's experience of the positive emotions; that is, a high-NA level does not necessarily imply a lack of joy, excitement, or enthusiasm" (p. 465). Thus, it also is possible for a person to be high on both PA and NA; such a person would be predisposed to experiencing high positive mood states and high negative mood states. Because positive and negative moods are independent over time and NA and PA are independent personality traits, this is certainly plausible. In further support of this two-dimensional structure and the link between PA and NA and positive moods and negative moods, respectively, using factor-analytic techniques, Meyer and Shack (1989) confirmed that PA (trait) and positive affect (state) define a common dimension in combined mood–personality space and NA (trait) and negative affect (state) share a second dimension of this space. As Meyer and Shack (1989) indicate, in recent years a consensus has formed that a two-dimensional structure adequately describes self-rated affect at its broadest level (Diener, Larsen, Levine, & Emmons, 1985; Larsen & Diener, 1985; Russell, 1978, 1979; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1984; Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Zevon & Tellegen, 1982). In a similar fashion, within the study of personality there is agreement on (at least) a two-dimensional structure that adequately describes "normal" personality in its broadest representation (H. J. Eysenck, 1981; H. J. Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985; Gray, 1972, 1981). (p. 691)

Again, their results and the results of numerous other studies (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1980; Emmons & Diener, 1986; Tellegen, 1985; Warr et al., 1983; Watson & Clark, 1984) indicate that NA (or NA-type measures) underlie negative affective states and PA (or PA-type measures) underlie positive affective states. Once again, support for these relationships in a work context is provided by George (1989), who found that NA was significantly and positively related to the experience of negative mood at work and PA was significantly and positively related to the experience of positive mood at work. Hence, in our model of organizational spontaneity, affective disposition in the form of PA is hypothesized to be a key determinant of positive mood at work.

Life event history: Whereas affective disposition exerts considerable influence on mood states, moods quite likely also vary depending on a person's particular circumstances. We characterize these circumstances as life events. Life events can be positive or negative and work-related or non-work-related. Examples of positive life events are receiving a promotion at work or getting married. Each of these events is likely to positively affect positive mood at work. Examples of negative life events include getting fired from one's job or the death of a
loved one. Again, each of these negative life events probably 
will influence one's negative mood at work. Thus, even if a 
person is low on PA, positive life events may result in positive 
moods and vice versa. Interestingly enough, and confirming a 
bidimensional mood structure, researchers have found that 
good events are usually more strongly associated with positive 
mood and bad events are more highly related to negative mood 
Over time, bad events do not seem to decrease positive moods, 
and good events do not lessen negative moods (Emmons, 1986). 
This also is consistent with L. A. Clark and Watson's (1988) 
suggestion that positive moods are associated with the experi-
ence of rewards and negative moods are linked to punishments. 
However, note that there have been some conflicting results in 
this regard. That is, Headey and Wearing (1989) found that 
both favorable and adverse life events affected positive mood, 
whereas only adverse events influenced negative moods.

Positive work-related life events include events that positively 
reflect on a worker's competence, worth, and achievement or 
involve the recognition of these characteristics. Such events 
might include (but are not limited to) successfully completing a 
significant project, receiving a promotion, receiving a pay raise, 
being treated with respect, being involved in what one considers 
to be meaningful work, and receiving an award or some other 
acknowledgment of achievement. As Isen, Daubman, and No-
wicki (1987) suggest, "the most important way of inducing 
good feelings may be allowing workers to achieve a sense of 
competence, self-worth, and respect" (p. 1129). Also, in support 
of this, Ouchi and Johnson (1978) and others (e.g., Argyris, 
1957) propose that organizational structure and control mecha-
nisms can have important effects on emotional well-being.

Negative work-related life events that are expected to have a 
particularly strong effect on negative mood at work include 
events that have a negative effect on one's economic well-being. 
Such events include (but are not limited to) impending layoff or 
the threat of such, reductions in pay rates, reductions in paid 
working hours, reductions in fringe benefits (Brief & Atieh, 
1987), and demotion. Events signaling a negative evaluation of 
a worker's performance would also be included in this category 
to the extent that they reflect diminished job security and po-
tential economic consequences. Obviously, other negative (e.g., 
interpersonal conflicts) and positive (e.g., improved equipment) 
events at work may influence moods in addition to the types of 
events described above. Likewise, non-work-related events af-
flect moods at work. For example, being in a satisfactory roman-
tic relationship would probably affect most people's feelings on 
and off the job.

There has been some debate in the social psychological litera-
ture as to the underlying cause of relationships between life 
events and indicators of well-being (e.g., mood and health and 
ilness) (e.g., Brett, Brief, Burke, George, & Webster, 1990; 
Some maintain that observed relationships between life events 
and various outcomes are primarily due to the effects of person-
ality (NA and PA) (Schroeder & Costa, 1984); others suggest 
that life events have effects on indicators of well-being, inde-
pendent of personality (e.g., Maddi et al., 1987). Headey and Wear-
ing (1989) conducted a panel study to try to further understand 
the relations among personality, life events, and well-being (in-
cluding positive and negative moods). Their results suggest that 
life events affect mood over and above the influence of personal-
ality or disposition. Hence, in our model, positive work-related 
and non-work-related life events are the primary situational de-
terminants (at the individual level of analysis) of positive mood 
at work.

Primary Work Group

Affective tone. Also operating through positive mood is a 
third and, we speculate, a considerably potent facilitator of orga-
nizational spontaneity, the primary work group, or—more pre-
cisely—the positive affective tone of that group. We construe 
the primary work group as that set of individuals, within the 
organization, with whom one interacts frequently in carrying 
out his or her prescribed role. After George (1990), "affective 
tone [italics added] is defined as consistent or homogeneous 
affective reactions within a group" (p. 36). The term consistent 
is key: If affective reactions are not consistent within a group, 
then it is meaningless to speak of the affective tone of that 
group. If consistency is demonstrated, however, then affective 
tone exists for the group at the group level of analysis; affective 
tone is a group property because it depends on a group charac-
teristic, namely, consistency in affect within the group. George 
(1990), in fact, provides substantial empirical support that indi-
vidual affect is consistent within work groups. Again, however, 
consistency in affect may not be found in all work groups; when 
affective reactions are not homogeneous within a group, then 
the group does not have an affective tone and, hence, this com-
ponent of the model will not be applicable in this type of situa-
tion.

If a group has a positive affective tone, then members of the 
group typically experience positive mood states at work. Alter-
natively, if some members of a group experience positive moods 
and others do not, then the group does not have an affective 
tone, because affect is not consistent within the group.

Theoretically, one might expect affective reactions or moods 
to be consistent within groups for a number of reasons. For 
example, Schneider's (1987) attraction—selection—attrition 
(A-S-A) framework suggests that ASA processes may result in 
similarity in affective reactions within work settings. addition-
ally, during socialization into the group, group members quite 
likely acquire an overall positive or negative orientation to the 
work situation that may be manifested in characteristic moods 
at work (George, 1990). Finally, social influence processes 
within groups probably lead to some consistency in affect (Sa-
lancik & Pfeffer, 1978). As mentioned above and congruent 
with these theoretical rationale, George (1990) found that indi-
vidual affect or mood was consistent within work groups. Note 
that affective tone is only a relevant construct when the pro-
cesses that lead to consistent affective reactions in groups are 
able to operate. That is, positive affective tone is only plausible 
as a construct when A-S-A, socialization, and social influence 
processes can take place within a group to produce consistency 
in positive mood. Hence, in a newly formed group or a nominal 
group, affective tone is not meaningful, and consistency in af-
fact would not be expected because A-S-A, socialization, and 
social influence processes have not taken place to produce con-
 sistency in mood.
This should not be interpreted, however, that affect at the individual level of analysis is indistinguishable empirically or theoretically irrelevant. Rather, all that is being asserted is that the affective tone of a group will influence an individual's mood at work. Put simply, an individual is more likely to feel good if he or she is surrounded by people who are happy and, hence, the positive affective tone of a group is expected to exert a positive influence on a person's positive mood at work. So, for instance, a newcomer to a group with a high-positive-affective tone will be more likely to experience positive moods at work than would a newcomer to a group with a low-positive-affective tone or a newcomer to a group that was not characterized by consistent affective reactions. However, other factors, in addition to group affective tone, influence an individual's mood. Thus, existence of an affective tone for a group indicates relative consistency in affect, not invariability. For instance, it is easy to conceive of a person who belongs to a primary work group characterized as enthusiastic, active, and excited but, because of some non-work-related problem, feels sluggish and depressed. Conversely, even if an individual is in a group that is generally not positively oriented, that person may still experience positive moods because of, for example, recently receiving a promotion.

At this point, note that for simplicity's sake, in Figure 1, the arrow leading from the positive affective tone of the work group to positive mood at work is unidirectional, consistent with the foregoing rationale. Strictly speaking, one could argue that in addition to the positive affective tone of the group influencing individual positive mood at work, individual positive mood at work contributes to the affective tone of the group. However, it is not as simple as it might seem. That is, an individual's mood contributes to the affective tone of the group when affective reactions within the group are relatively homogeneous and consistent with the individual's mood or to the extent that the individual is decisive in creating the group's affective tone. If affective reactions within the group are not consistent, then the group does not have an affective tone; hence, it is meaningless to speak of the determinants of the affective tone. If affective reactions within the group are homogeneous and consistent with individual mood, then individual mood reinforces the overall affective tone of the group. If affective tone exists in a group and it is inconsistent with an individual's mood, there are three possibilities: (a) on the basis of procedures described later, it is determined that affect is still relatively consistent within the group; in this case, the individual's mood contributes little to affective tone, (b) on the basis of the same procedures mentioned in (a), it is determined that the group does not have an affective tone; in this case, individual mood has, in a sense, contributed to the demise of the affective tone of the group, and (c) the individual in question is so dominant or influential that his or her mood "infects" the group as a whole; in this case, individual mood plays a decisive role in determining affective tone. Though acknowledging these possibilities, our model focuses on the influence the group's positive affective tone has on an individual's positive mood at work, given our focus on organizational spontaneity and its direct antecedent, positive mood at work. Nonetheless, we realize that the relation in question may entail complex, reciprocal relationships. What determines the positive affective tone of the primary work group? Five factors are posited here.

**Group size.** Considerable evidence suggests that increasing group size is associated with a less favorable group affective tone. This association is attributable to a number of consequences of increasing size, for example, (a) the frequency and duration of member interactions decrease, (b) emotional ties among members decrease, (c) member attraction to the group decreases, and (d) disagreement, antagonism, and tension release increase (e.g., Bass & Norton, 1951; Berger & Cummings, 1979; Hare, 1952; Katz, 1949; Schull, Delbecq, & Cummings, 1970; Shaw, 1981). In the extreme, increasing group size may even negate the notion of group affective tone. That is, we suspect, in very large primary work groups, the likelihood of consistent affective reactions is slim.

**Proximity.** We also suspect less consistency in affect when group members are separated from one another by considerable physical distance. Moreover, it is known that as the physical distance between group members decreases, the attraction members have for one another increases (e.g., Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950; Hare, 1962). This probably is so because proximity makes it possible for members to come into contact and interact with each other (Shaw, 1981) and social interaction has been found to be positively related to positive moods (Bradburn, 1969; Bradburn & Caplovitz, 1965; Harding, 1982; Headey, Holstrom, & Wearing, 1985; Phillips, 1967; Zautra, 1983). Thus, we posit that increasing proximity, most often, is associated with a more favorable group affective tone. We place the qualifier, most often, in our proposition because although most data indicate increases in office density (a factor closely associated with proximity) are related to work satisfaction (e.g., Szilagyi & Holland, 1980), other data show a positive and significant relationship between density and crowding (e.g., Oldham & Rotchford, 1983). Crowding is known to affect groups adversely (e.g., Worcel & Yohai, 1979). Another, lesser, reason for our qualifier perhaps is more speculative. That is, the proposed effects of proximity may be lessened to the degree technological alternatives are available to facilitate social interaction and, thereby, substitute for close physical distance. We are unaware, however, of any data bearing directly on the substitution effects of technology for proximity.

**Leader positive affect.** In addition to size and proximity, we propose leader affect as a potent source of group affective tone. Here, our argument is rather straightforward. The moods of managers "rub off" on their subordinates. That is, leaders who feel, for example, enthusiastic and peppy (i.e., who experience high positive affect; Watson & Tellegen, 1985) are more likely to affect positively their group's affective tone then leaders who feel, for instance, dull and sluggish. Consistent with this reasoning is Bass's (1981) observation that highly successful leaders tend to exhibit a high rate of energy output and, even more pertinent, George and Bettenhausen's (1990) finding that the group leader's positive affect is related positively to prosocial behavior performed by the group (r = .43, p ≤ .01). Available data are too sparse to conclude that leader affect drives group affect rather than the plausible converse, but, on conceptual grounds, it probably could be argued that the relationship is reciprocal. Our current focus, however, leads us to emphasize the contagious nature of leader positive mood.
Similarity of group members. The similarity of group members’ attitudes, beliefs, and values also is posited to influence positive affective tone. Once again, our reasoning is rather simple. People that hold like attitudes and share similar beliefs and values are attracted to one another, get along well together, and, therefore, as a group, feel good. In fact, it long has been recognized, for example, that attitude similarity is a basis for attraction (e.g., Newcomb, 1956) and that such similarity is associated positively with prosocial behavior (e.g., Krebs, 1975). Although we do not address how similarity arises in work groups, the theorizing of Schneider (1987) suggests that it may be a function of an A-S-A cycle yielding particular kinds of people in an organization. Thus, when this presumably naturally occurring cycle somehow is disrupted artificially, we would expect work groups to exhibit lower levels of similarity in attitudes, beliefs, and values and, thus, a less positive affective tone.

Dispositional composition of the group. The last factor posited to influence group affective tone, disposition (or personality), generally is construed as a trait of individuals, not, groups. Here, our focus is on the dispositional composition of the group or the characteristic levels of PA within the work group (George, 1990). Our use of the phrase characteristic levels is important. That is, whereas group dynamics research (e.g., Shaw, 1981) primarily addresses the effects of the compatibility of group members’ personality, we posit that if personality, in the form of PA, is homogeneous within a group, then the positive affective tone of the group is influenced by the characteristic level of PA within the group. This proposition, of course, assumes that personality scores within a work group can be aggregated meaningfully; that is, the scores are consistent.

Schneider’s (1987) A-S-A framework provides the theoretical rationale for this expected consistency. The A-S-A framework proposes, among other things, that people with similar personalities tend to be attracted to, selected by, and retained in work settings resulting in consistency in personality within those settings. Thus, through A-S-A processes, levels of the personality trait PA may be relatively consistent within work groups. There are several mechanisms through which A-S-A processes may lead to similar levels of PA within a group. Some of these are discussed by George (1990). For instance, human resources administrators and managers in organizations may try to place new employees in work groups that they will fit into; in essence, their implicit personality judgments may influence placement decisions so that people who appear to be similar in personality are grouped together. As another example, because similarity of personality is a determinant of attraction (e.g., Byrne, Griffitt, & Stefaniak, 1967; Griffitt, 1966), individuals may be more likely to be attracted to and remain in work groups whose members have personalities similar to their own. Conversely, individuals placed in work groups in which the other members’ personalities are inconsistent with their own may be more likely to leave the group and seek a transfer to a more compatible group. However, note that if A-S-A processes are not able to operate or are limited in some way (e.g., in a nominal group or a newly formed group), then we would not expect much consistency in levels of PA. In any case, if members of a group all have the same or similar levels of PA, then they also will quite likely experience similar levels of positive mood at work, leading to a group-positive-affective tone. Hence, to the extent that PA is consistent within a group, the group’s characteristic level of PA is expected to have a direct effect on the group’s positive affective tone. In support of this proposition, George (1990) found, in a retail setting, that a group’s characteristic level of PA was significantly related to the group’s positive affective tone. Again, if consistency in PA within a group is not found, then it is meaningless to speak of the dispositional composition of the group in terms of PA, and this variable should not be used in subsequent analyses.

For simplicity’s sake, Figure 1 depicts the individual characteristics (including PA) as being independent of the group characteristics (including characteristic levels of PA within the group). By now, it is probably clear that characteristic levels of PA within a group are determined by first ensuring that A-S-A processes can be operating and then testing for consistency or homogeneity of PA within the group. Hence, if consistency in PA is found within a group, then individual PA contributes to determining the characteristic level of PA within the group. However, if levels of PA within a group are not consistent, then individual PA does not contribute anything to PA at the group level of analysis because the latter is essentially meaningless and should not be relied on as a predictor of group affective tone.

To summarize, we propose that a set of primary-work-group characteristics influences the positive affective tone of the group. Specifically, we posit that positive affective tone is an increasing function of (a) decreasing group size, (b) increasing member proximity (up to the point of crowding), (c) increasing enthusiasm, pep, and other signs of positive affect on the part of the group’s leader, (d) increasing similarity of members’ attitudes, beliefs, and values, and (e) increasing characteristic levels of PA within the group. Moreover, we recognize that under certain conditions (e.g., when groups are very large or members widely dispersed), a group affective tone may not be evident. That is, the members of a primary work group cannot always be said to exhibit consistent or homogeneous affective reactions. We speculate that when a group affective tone does not exist, the individual factors discussed earlier take on added importance. Likewise, if A-S-A processes cannot operate and levels of PA within a group are not consistent, then the group does not have a characteristic level of PA; in this case, PA is not a meaningful construct at the group level of analysis and should not be used in this manner. Hence, whereas—on the basis of prior research and the A-S-A framework—we expect that PA will tend to be consistent within groups (e.g., George, 1990; Schneider, 1987), we also acknowledge that this will not always be the case.

Given that the demonstration of consistency within groups is of vital importance for two of the group constructs (i.e., the positive affective tone of the group and characteristic levels of PA within the group), a brief discussion of methods to determine consistency within groups is warranted at this point. Because the relevant concern here is the demonstration of consistency within groups rather than differences across groups, use of standard analysis of variance procedures or the intraclass correlation coefficient is not that appropriate, because these indexes depend on between-groups differences for significance (Schneider & Bowen, 1985). However, such indexes may be useful in terms of helping to explain null results using the group
variable in question (i.e., if there are no differences across groups on a given variable, then correlations involving that variable will necessarily be close to 0). Getting back to the demonstration of consistency within groups, at least two procedures have been used to this end (e.g., George, 1990; George & Bettenhausen, 1990; Schneider & Bowen, 1985). The first procedure relies on the estimate of within-group consistency or interrater reliability provided by James, Demarce, and Wolf (1984). Essentially, this procedure relies on a comparison of observed within-group consistency or agreement to the consistency or agreement one would expect by chance (Schneider & Bowen, 1985). The second procedure uses the standard deviation of scores within a group and the standard error of the mean score to form a 95% confidence interval for the mean score (Schmidt & Hunter, 1989); small confidence intervals indicate more consistency within the group. More generally, note also that research on the dispositional composition of work groups in terms of PA and group-positive-affective tone is extremely limited. Hence, some may find some of the ideas presented here controversial, and, in any case, more research is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn.

**Contextual Characteristics**

It is generally recognized that relatively mundane and commonplace contextual and environmental factors (e.g., pleasant music) can influence positive mood (e.g., L. A. Clark & Watson, 1988; M. S. Clark & Ison, 1982). In our model, we refer to such factors as **contextual characteristics**, which are expected to indirectly influence organizational spontaneity through their direct effect on positive mood. Contextual characteristics include factors such as the physical surroundings at work, locations of windows, color schemes, and size of the work area. For instance, having an attractive painting in one’s office may promote positive moods, and working in a barren, windowless cubicle may dampen positive feelings. Having some common work areas and the extent to which the physical layout of the work setting allows for interaction (Brebner, 1982; Eden & Leviatan, 1974; Steele, 1973; Walker & Guest, 1952) also probably affect mood. In support of this, studies have shown that how attractive and comfortable the physical work setting is influences, for example, the formality and openness of interpersonal interactions and prosocial behavior (Brebner, 1982; Pfeffer, 1982). As another example, Oldham and Rotchford (1983) found that office density and darkness were significantly associated with work and social satisfaction. Davis (1984) suggests that it is useful to view the physical environment of work settings along three dimensions: physical structure, physical stimuli, and symbolic artifacts. He also indicates that although managers may ignore the consequences of such recurring stimuli, they can have important effects on psychological and behavioral outcomes. Our discussion of contextual characteristics, which may be influential in this regard, is by no means exhaustive, but rather is suggestive of the wide range of factors that may be important. For example, research conducted by Baron and his colleagues (e.g., Baron, 1990; Baron, Russell, & Arms, 1985) suggests that environmental factors such as atmospheric electricity (in the form of negative ions) and pleasant scents can affect mood states.

**Katz’s Motivational Bases**

The final set of variables in our model of spontaneity were taken directly from Katz (1964). More specifically, Katz (1964) identified six motivational patterns in organizations and claimed four of these to be possible bases of organizational spontaneity. One of these four, involvement in primary-workgroup relationships, was just discussed. Now, we focus on instrumental individual rewards, instrumental system rewards, and internalization of organizational goals and values.

**Individualized rewards.** Katz (1964) states that individualized rewards (in the form of money and recognition) are most useful for obtaining optimal role performance, rather than innovative and nonspecific behaviors. However, he asserts that “spectacular instances of innovative behavior can be singled out for recognition and awards” (Katz, 1964, p. 140). Thus, we expect the organizational use of individualized rewards to be related directly to organizational spontaneity rather weakly and then only to some forms (e.g., making suggestions) and not others (e.g., spreading goodwill). Moreover, following Katz, we expect this weak relationship only to hold when the individualized rewards are perceived as (a) large, (b) directly related to the spontaneous act and directly following its accomplishment, and (c) equitable.

**Membership awards.** According to Katz (1964), another weak motivational basis of organizational spontaneity is membership awards. Individuals receive these benefits simply by virtue of their membership in the organization; these are across-the-board rewards, which apply to all workers at a given level in the hierarchy. Although membership rewards are relatively effective for holding members within the organization, they do little to motivate behavior beyond the line of duty, with two exceptions: helping co-workers and spreading goodwill. Katz (1964) reasons that these forms of organizational spontaneity are promoted by “a more favorable mood” being created by membership rewards, which helps people to develop “a liking for the attractions of the organization” (p. 138). In any case, membership awards must be uniformly applied to all members of an organization or reasonable major groupings within the organization for them to be effective (Katz & Kahn, 1978).

**Internalized organizational values.** Unlike the motivational bases of organizational spontaneity in the previous paragraphs, internalized organizational values are a potentially strong force. They are not, however, a widespread one. Where this pattern of motivation prevails, “individuals take over organizational objectives as part of their own personal goals. They identify not with the organization as a safe and secure haven but with its major purposes” (Katz, 1964, p. 143). Such value expression and self-identification, Katz (1964) states, activate extra-role behaviors. However, he goes on to assert that the internalization of organizational values is generally only evident at high levels of the hierarchy. Indeed, he observes that on the occasion that rank-and-file members do internalize the organization’s values, they often are referred to as “dedicated damn fools” (Katz, 1964, p. 143). Moreover, he implies that these “damn fools” tend to be found in voluntary organizations—not, for instance, in business organizations.

In conclusion, Katz’s (1964) motivational bases have a weak or limited direct effect on organizational spontaneity. As de-
picted in Figure 1, we posit that they also have indirect effects through mood, at both the group and individual levels. These indirect effects are consistent with those suggested by Katz (1964). More generally, they are consistent with the idea that the availability of rewards (e.g., money and recognition, as well as intrinsic rewards associated with one's values being realized) is associated with organizational members feeling good (L. A. Clark & Watson, 1988). Indeed, results from the social psychological literature (e.g., Isen, 1970; Isen & Levin, 1972; Isen, Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982) show that even amazingly small positive outcomes (e.g., juice and cookies) can influence behavior through mood.

Conclusions

Helping co-workers, protecting the organization, making constructive suggestions, developing oneself, and spreading goodwill are behaviors necessary for organizational effectiveness, yet they are not (and often cannot) be specified by role prescriptions. Although these forms of spontaneous behavior frequently do occur in organizations, they have not been the focus of systematic study. To draw attention to this neglect, we propose a model of organizational spontaneity.

A pivotal construct in our model of organizational spontaneity is positive mood at work. Mood has been shown to have powerful effects on thought processes and behavior, yet has received very limited attention in organizational settings. Ratios for the relationships between positive mood at work and each of the forms of spontaneity have been provided, and more generally, it stands to reason that voluntary spontaneous acts would be most susceptible to the pervasive influences of positive mood. Put differently, we would expect positive mood at work to have the most effect on behaviors that are performed of one's free will (are spontaneous).

Although we focused primarily on positive mood at work, we did not mean to imply that negative mood at work is unimportant or that it does not have any beneficial consequences for organizations. Rather, our focus on positive mood was driven by our concern with spontaneity. Indeed, negative mood also may have some beneficial consequences for organizations. For example, negative mood may influence performance on tasks requiring critical thinking. For instance, in decision-making contexts, people in negative moods may be more likely to attend to negative aspects of a proposed alternative and focus on potential disadvantages and problems. Such people may play the important role of a devil's advocate in a policymaking group (Janis, 1982). Note also that both positive and negative mood may have some adverse consequences for organizations. For example, individuals in positive moods may be resistant to change to the extent that they view change as a threat to their positive moods, and individuals in negative moods may have heightened aggressive inclinations (Berkowitz, 1989). In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that positive and negative mood are relatively independent of each other.

More generally, the research reviewed in this article suggests that mood may be an important determinant of, at least, certain forms of organizational behavior. This suggests that although the cognitive perspective may be a dominant force in the field (Ilgen & Klein, 1989), feelings and emotions also play an important role in organizational life.

The primary work group is quite influential in our model of spontaneity. The primary work group includes the organizational members who are most likely to influence a given individual, interact with that individual, and affect how that individual feels. The leaders of these groups (in particular, their positive mood states at work) are expected to be especially important, particularly in terms of their influence on the positive affective tone of the primary work group as a whole. Our model also takes into account the individual, in terms of both his or her positive affective disposition and the favorable life events he or she experiences. Both individual factors are proposed to have direct effects on positive mood at work.

Admittedly, the relationships among the constructs depicted in Figure 1 are probably much more complex than we have suggested. For example, many of the relationships may be reciprocal over time, and the primary-work-group characteristics and affective tone are necessarily related to some of the individual factors. However, our intent in providing a simpler account was to focus attention on organizational spontaneity and its direct antecedent, positive mood at work, and the relationships that at this point we think are most promising or important. This is not meant to downgrade the importance of other relationships not specified in the model.

As implied throughout the article, there are many promising areas for future research to focus on with regard to organizational spontaneity. At this point, we would like to highlight a few areas that we think are especially in need of attention. First, a key challenge facing researchers in this area is the measurement of organizational spontaneity. Because the five forms of spontaneity refer to behaviors that are not specified by role prescriptions, organizations themselves are not accustomed to measuring these behaviors, nor can they be assessed by measuring the extent to which an individual fulfills certain specific requirements. Moreover, the very nature of these behaviors suggests that workers' superiors (who are often used as assessors of work behaviors) may not always be aware of their occurrence. Given the diversity of the forms of spontaneity, different measurement techniques will very likely be needed for the various forms. For example, helping co-workers may be best assessed by surveying the co-workers a worker comes into contact with on a day-to-day basis regarding the worker's degree of helpfulness and looking for convergence across these assessments. Protecting the organization and making constructive suggestions might be measured by observing such behaviors over time or by presenting individuals with "naturally occurring" opportunities to display the behavior in question. As a final example, developing oneself may be measured by self-reports of such activities or assessments by key informants who might be aware of these behaviors (e.g., one's supervisor or colleagues). Ideally, multiple indicators of each of the forms of spontaneity would be developed, and convergence across the measures and forms could be assessed.

Another important area for future research is the study of the positive affective tone of the primary work group, its effects on positive mood at work, and its key antecedents. Examples of some primary issues to be addressed here include the mechanisms by which affective tone influences mood states over time,
the relative contributions of the five proposed group antecedents of the positive affective tone of a group, and the specification of the conditions that make it likely that members of a group will have consistent affective reactions.

It also is important for research to focus on the proposed links between the pivotal construct in our model, positive mood at work, and each of the five forms of organizational spontaneity. These are a few examples of some of the areas we think are especially in need of attention. This is not meant to imply that these are the only areas that we consider to be promising or important. Indeed, this is not the case: We think that other issues are important as well (e.g., how positive affectivity and positive life event history combine to influence positive mood at work and the direct and indirect effects of Katz’s, 1964, motivational bases on organizational spontaneity).

In summary, we think the time is ripe for the study of organizational spontaneity. Given presumed increases in the uncertainty and change confronting organizations (Hage, 1988), it is important now (perhaps more than ever) to understand what causes workers to perform spontaneous gestures to help, protect, and improve an organization. As uncertainty and change increase, it becomes more difficult to prescribe all duties and responsibilities in advance. By gaining a firm understanding of the causes of organizational spontaneity, we will be in a better position to help ensure that it occurs.

References


Byrne, D., Griffitt, W., & Steffaniak, D. (1967). Attraction and similarity of personality characteristics. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5, 82–90.


P&C Board Appoints Editor for New Journal:

**Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology**

In the fall of 1993, APA will begin publishing a new journal, *Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology*. Charles R. Schuster, PhD, has been appointed as editor. Starting immediately, manuscripts should be submitted to

Charles R. Schuster, PhD  
P.O. Box 2795  
Kensington, MD 20891-2795

*Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology* seeks to promote the discipline of psychopharmacology in its fullest diversity. Psychopharmacology necessarily involves behavioral changes, psychological processes, or their physiological substrates as one central variable and psychopharmacological agents as a second central variable. Such agents will include drugs, medications, and chemicals encountered in the workplace or environment. One goal of *Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology* is to foster basic research and the development of theory in psychopharmacology. Another is to encourage the integration of basic and applied research, the development of better treatments for drug abuse, and more effective pharacoetherapeutics. To this end, the journal publishes original empirical research involving animals or humans that spans from (a) behavioral pharmacology research on social, behavioral, cognitive, emotional, physiological, and neurochemical mechanisms of drug– or chemical–behavior interaction and behavioral toxicity; to (b) descriptive and experimental studies of drug abuse including its etiology, progression, adverse effects, and behavioral and pharmacological treatment; to (c) controlled clinical trials that, in addition to improving the effectiveness, range, or depth of application, will also increase our understanding of psychological functions or their drug modulation. The journal also publishes theoretical and integrative analyses and reviews that promote our understanding and further systematic research in psychopharmacology. Although case studies are not appropriate, occasional small-sample experiments with special populations may be considered. The journal is intended to be informative and useful to both basic and applied researchers and to practitioners operating in varied settings. *Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology* seeks to be the vehicle for the best research and ideas integrating pharmacology and behavior.